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ABSTRACT 
Evaluating Efficient Public Good Provision: Theory and Evidence from  
a Generalised Conditional Efficiency Model for Public Libraries    
by Kristof De Witte and Benny Geys * 
Provision of most public goods (e.g., health care, libraries, education, police, fire 
protection, utilities) can be characterised by a two-stage production process. In 
the first stage, basic inputs (e.g., labour and capital) are used to generate 
service potential (e.g., opening hours, materials), which is then, in the second 
stage, transformed into observed outputs (e.g., school outcomes, library 
circulation, crimes solved). As final outputs are also affected by demand-side 
factors, conflating both production stages likely leads to biased inferences about 
public productive (in)efficiency and its determinants. Hence, this paper uses a 
specially tailored, fully non-parametric efficiency model allowing for both outlying 
observations and heterogeneity to analyse efficient public good provision in 
stage one only. We employ a dataset comprising all 290 Flemish public 
libraries. Our findings suggest that ideological stance of the local government, 
wealth and density of the local population and source of library funding (i.e., 
local funding versus intergovernmental transfers) strongly affect library 
productive efficiency. 
 
Keywords: Public good provision, conditional efficiency, nonparametric estimation, 
libraries, local govenment 
 
JEL classification: C14, C61, I21 
                                                 
*  The authors are grateful to Jos Blank, Elbert Dijkgraaf, Beate Jochimsen, Mika Kortelainen, Erwin 
Ooghe and seminar participants at WZB Berlin for useful comments and suggestions. The usual caveat 
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Evaluierung der effizienten Bereitstellung öffentlicher Güter: Theorie und 
Belege aus einem allgemeinem Modell bedingter Effizienz für öffentliche 
Bibliotheken  
Die Bereitstellung der meisten öffentlichen Güter (zum Beispiel Gesundheits-
versorgung, Bibliotheken, Bildung, Polizei, Brandschutz, Stadtwerke) kann 
durch einen zweistufigen Produktionsprozess charakterisiert werden. In der 
ersten Stufe werden Produktionsfaktoren (beispielsweise Arbeit und Kapital) zur 
Erzeugung eines Dienstleistungspotenzials (beispielsweise Öffnungszeiten, 
Materialien) genutzt. Dieses Potenzial wird dann, in der zweiten Phase, in den 
beobachtbaren Output transformiert (zum Beispiel in Schulleistungen der 
Schüler, dem Bücherumlauf einer Bibliothek, aufgedeckte Straftaten). Da das 
Endergebnis auch von den Faktoren der Nachfrageseite bestimmt ist, führt eine 
unzureichende Trennung beider Produktionsstufen wahrscheinlich zu verzerrten 
Rückschlüssen bezüglich der öffentlichen produktiven (In-)Effizienz und ihrer 
Determinanten. Daher wird in dem Paper ein speziell zugeschnittenes, 
vollständig nichtparametrisches Effizienz-Modell benutzt. Dieses Modell ermög-
licht isoliert für die 1. Produktionsstufe die Analyse der effizienten Bereitstellung 
öffentlicher Güter in einem Schritt.  Dabei benutzen die Autoren einen Daten-
satz, welcher alle 290 flämischen öffentlichen Bibliotheken enthält. Die Ergeb-
nisse legen nahe,  dass die ideologische Einstellung der Gemeindeverwal-
tungen, Wohlstand und Dichte der ortsansässigen Bevölkerung, sowie die Art 
der Bibliotheksfinanzierung (zum Beispiel lokale Finanzierung oder überregio-
nale Transfers) stark die produktive Effizienz der Bibliotheken beeinflussen.   
 
1 Introduction
In much the same way that concerns over allocative eﬃciency are at the heart of micro-
economic theory (e.g., Leibenstein, 1966; Frantz, 1992), allocative eﬃciency in the public
sector has always been a major concern in public finance. Numerous studies, for example,
analyze whether local governments - which often have important responsibilities with respect
to education, housing, health care, social welfare, recreation, infrastructure and the environ-
ment (including refuse collection) (John, 2001) - have a tendency to over- or underprovide
public goods (see, e.g., the pioneering work of Brueckner, 1979, 1982, 1983 and many refer-
ences thereto). Moreover, scholars studying the decentralization of tasks from higher-level
governments to the local level often evaluate this evolution in terms of allocative eﬃciency.
Smaller jurisdictions with more homogeneous populations are argued to increase allocative
eﬃciency as they are more capable of matching the provision of public goods with the pref-
erences of their constituents (Musgrave, 1959; Oates, 1972), while numerous "informal and
formal versions of the Tiebout model demonstrate that private allocative eﬃciency tends to
be increased by Tiebout choice" (Hoxby, 2000, 1211).
In contrast, this paper concentrates on local government productive eﬃciency.1 This has
received significantly less attention in the decentralization literature thus far (for important
exceptions, see, e.g., Hoxby, 1999, 2000), even though one could argue that decentralization
is most fruitful when local governments are, all else equal, more productively eﬃcient than
higher-level governments (e.g., Geys and Moesen, 2009). This relative neglect is all the more
surprising given that the financial constraints within which local governments are expected
to execute their (increasing) assignments have tightened significantly over the past decades.
Indeed, given that tax- and deficit-increases are often politically costly (e.g., Geys and Ver-
meir, 2008a, b), one way to deal with increasing tasks and tightening budget requirements is
to improve productive or technical eﬃciency (understood in terms of providing a maximum
amount of output for a given level of inputs; see Koopmans, 1951; Fried et al., 2008).
We are clearly not the first attempting to measure and explain local government produc-
tive eﬃciency (for reviews, see Tang, 1997; De Borger and Kerstens, 2000). Yet, we diﬀer
from this previous body of work in three crucial respects. First, we build on important - but
often neglected - insights from the urban governance and public administration literatures to
more thoroughly describe the public sector production process prior to the actual analysis.
These literatures illustrate that eﬀective public service provision depends on an active involve-
ment by the recipient of these services (e.g., Whitaker, 1980; Parks et al., 1981; Kiser, 1984;
1As in the private sector, eﬃciency constitutes one among many aims; including eﬀectiveness, equity,
responsiveness, adequateness and appropriateness (Dunn, 2004). Our focus on productive eﬃciency obviously
does not imply that it should take precedence over other aims of public service provision. Note also that we
will use the terms productive and technical eﬃciency interchangeably throughout the paper.
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Parry, 1996). That is, schools can "supply little education without inputs from students",
police forces have "very little capacity to aﬀect community safety and security without citizen
input" such as reporting crimes or testifying in court (Parks et al., 1981, 1003), waste col-
lection services require citizen coproduction "in the form of transporting household waste to
the curb" (Percy, 1984, 436) and tax collection is eased with "citizens refraining from illegal
actions" and "submitting tax returns" (Alford, 2002, 39). Such ‘coproduction’ has impor-
tant implications for the measurement of technical eﬃciency, as it suggests that observable
outcomes (e.g., library circulation, school results, waste collected, fires extinguished, crimes
solved) - the most commonly employed output indicator in existing studies of public sector
productive eﬃciency2 - are inappropriate as they are not really ‘produced’ in a strict sense
by the public service provider (see also Cordero-Ferrera et al., 2008). We therefore propose
to view public good provision as a two-stage production process (adapted from Hammond,
2002) in which, first, basic inputs — such as labour and capital — are translated into ‘service
potential’ — such as available materials and opening hours — and then, secondly, the latter
are transformed into observable outputs — such as school outcomes, library circulation or
crimes solved. Particularly in the first stage of this process can the public service producer
be most directly held accountable for translating a given amount of public expenditures into
a maximum possible amount of service potential (whereas the second stage is probably more
appropriately analyzed in a supply-demand framework).
As a second contribution, we employ a recently developed fully non-parametric framework
and thus do not impose any a priori assumption on the production technology. This is
crucial given the diﬃculty - if not impossibility - to argue that the public good production
process follows one or another functional form. While our approach is closely related to Data
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models (Charnes et al., 1978; Deprins et al., 1984), it goes
further than such models by allowing for outliers (following the order-m technique of Cazals
et al., 2002) and heterogeneity (building on the conditional eﬃciency estimators of Daraio and
Simar, 2005, 2007). Note that reliance on such conditional eﬃciency estimates is particularly
convenient as it does not require a separability condition (i.e., the assumption that the
exogenous environment does not influence the level of basic inputs and service potential).
The final model is based on De Witte and Kortelainen (2008), who extended Daraio and
Simar (2005, 2007) to allow for (1) both discrete and continuous exogenous variables and
(2) statistical inference in the conditional eﬃciency approach. As such, besides reducing
the impact of outliers and controlling for heterogeneity, we are able to non-parametrically
evaluate the influence of exogenous characteristics on productive eﬃciency.
The latter also constitutes our third contribution. Previous studies generally fail to evalu-
2See, for example, Worthington (2001) for the case of education or De Witte and Geys (2010) for the case
of libraries.
3
ate how the institutional environment — in terms of socio-demographic, economic or political
characteristics — aﬀects eﬃciency, or look at this via an econometric two-stage approach (e.g.,
De Borger et al., 1994; Geys, 2006; Hemmeter, 2006; Borge et al., 2008). Both exclusion
of such background factors and their use in a two-stage approach, however, leads to biased
results and incorrect inferences (see, respectively, Battese and Coelli, 1995 and Kumbhakar et
al., 1991; Reifschneider and Stevenson, 1991). In this paper, we exploit the above-mentioned
non-parametric conditional eﬃciency model to include the operational environment immedi-
ately in the eﬃciency estimates. Relying on extensive public choice and political economics
literatures, we thereby focus on the following elements: (1) ideological stance of the local
government, (2) share of women in the local council, (3) wealth of the municipality, (4)
population concentration, and (5) source of public funding.
While our central argument - and the ensuing empirical approach - can be readily ap-
plied to various public goods, our empirical application exploits an exceptionally rich dataset
of (all 290) municipal public libraries in Flanders in 2007.3 The Flemish setting is particu-
larly attractive since nearly every municipality has its own library, generating a large and
diverse dataset. Moreover, as the central and regional governments in Belgium set the over-
all framework in which local public service providers operate, the latter’s work is largely
execution-oriented and devoid of value choices (in contrast to, say, the US, where the value-
component of local policy decisions is larger). This generates a situation that is particularly
conducive to eﬃciency measurements as the value-content or neutrality of the inputs and
outputs then becomes less of an issue (see also Geys and Moesen, 2009). Finally, we focus on
libraries as local public library services are unlikely to be essential to individuals’ choice of
residence (for recent evidence, see Bhatt, 2010), unlike, for example, a jurisdictions’ public
education, tax policy or public safety. Moreover, selection of consumers by public libraries is
unlikely to occur (unlike in, for example, education or health care; e.g., Parry, 1996). This is
important since it strongly mitigates potential concerns about endogeneity and identification
(more details below). Our findings suggest that the ideological stance of the local govern-
ment, the wealth and density of the local population and the source of library funding (i.e.,
local funding versus intergovernmental transfers) are significant determinants of an eﬃcient
generation of service potential. At odds with recent work on the eﬀects of female representa-
tion on public policy (e.g., Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Geys and Revelli, 2009; Svaleryd,
2009), the number of women in the local government or the presence of a female mayor does
not add to the explanatory power of the model, ceteris paribus.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical
background and our main hypotheses. Section 3 introduces the estimation methodology,
3To facilitate the application in alternative settings, the R code underlying the present analysis is available
from the authors upon request.
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while Section 4 discusses the institutional setting and data. Our findings are presented in
Section 5. Finally, the main conclusions are summarized in Section 6.
2 Theoretical background and hypotheses
2.1 Public good provision as a two-stage production process
A key characteristic of many public services is that "without the productive activities of con-
sumers nothing of value will result" (Parks et al., 1981, 1002). Such view of the importance
of citizens-consumers as ‘co-producers’ of public service production and delivery first devel-
oped among urban governance and public administration scholars in the early 1980s (e.g.,
Whitaker, 1980; Parks et al., 1981; Kiser, 1984; Percy, 1984). Although discussion about the
exact nature, origins and consequences of such coproduction continues (e.g., Alford, 2002;
Mitlin, 2008), the basic idea is that eﬀective public service provision depends on active in-
volvement by the recipient of these services. That is, schools require students’ (and parents’)
eﬀort to produce decent exam results, health care provision can only succeed if doctors’ and
nurses’ orders are followed by patients, waste collection proceeds faster when citizens ap-
propriately bag it and transport it to the curb, unemployment assistance programs stand
or fall with the active engagement of the (long-term) unemployed, ... Urban scholars have
extensively discussed similar relevance of citizen involvement for a wide and varied range of
local public services including fire and police protection, libraries, tax collection, recreation,
and so on (for a review, see Percy, 1984).
Citizens’ coproduction represents a convenient way of pointing out that public goods have
the consumers in their production function. This, however, has important implications for
measuring public service providers’ technical or productive eﬃciency. Indeed, active involve-
ment by the recipient of the service implies that observable outcomes (e.g., library circulation,
school results, crimes resolved, fires extinguished and so on) are not really ‘produced’ in a
strict sense by the public service provider - and thus are inappropriate measures to evalu-
ate their technical (in)eﬃciency (see also Cordero-Ferrera et al., 2008). Indeed, given the
importance of demand-side factors in the service production process, relying on observable
outcomes in productive eﬃciency analyses may lead to strongly biased inferences. For exam-
ple, when observed library circulation (i.e., the final outcome) is low, a relatively high-cost
library will appear ineﬃcient when using circulation as the output variable in the analysis.
Yet, it may at the same time be very eﬃcient in translating its basic inputs (such as labour
and capital) into books, opening hours and so on. If so, using circulation as an output mea-
sure will lead it to be unduly described as productively ineﬃcient simply because it suﬀers
from low demand in its area. This is not to say that one should support locating such high-
cost libraries in low-demand areas. Clearly, this would be a waste of public resources (i.e.
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allocative ineﬃciency). Rather, the argument is that, from a purely productive eﬃciency per-
spective, this library should be recognized as being technically eﬃcient - and not be described
as an underperformer for an element beyond its control (i.e., public demand for its service).
To accurately evaluate public sector technical eﬃciency and its determinants, we argue
that one should concentrate on that part of the production process that is fully under the
control of the service provider.4 We therefore propose to view public good provision as
characterized by a two-stage production process (adapted from Hammond, 2002). In a first
stage, basic inputs — such as (expenditures on) labour and capital — are employed in the
production of what could be described as ‘service potential’ (Bookstein, 1981; Hammond,
2002). For public libraries, one can think of, for example, collection size and opening hours;
in education, it may include teaching hours, teaching materials, school library; in health
care, one can think of the number of hospital beds and operating rooms, opening hours,
machinery (and similarly for other types of public services such as police, fire protection,
water services, waste collection, and so on). In the second stage, this service potential is then
transformed into observable outputs. For libraries, this could reflect book circulation and
request processing, for health services the number of patients cured, and for fire and police
protection the amount of fires extinguished and crimes solved, respectively. At this stage, the
outcome is clearly not solely determined by the public service provider, but also depends to
an important extent on the ‘demand’ in a given area for the services provided. For example,
fire services are only provided if there are fires to be put out, while good exam results require
student input and library circulation a population that cares about reading. Evidently,
our distinction between service potential and final outputs is reminiscent of the distinction
proposed by Becker (1965) and Lancaster (1966) between goods and commodities; where
goods are seen as intermediate outcomes provided by firms and subsequently transformed by
consumers into commodities that fulfil their desires. In such view, food items in a supermarket
can be seen as goods, while individuals’ meals or nutrition are the commodity (or final
outcome) (see also Kiser, 1984).
This distinction between two production phases of public good provision allows analyses
of technical eﬃciency to concentrate on that stage of public good production where the ser-
vice provider has full control over the inputs and outputs (i.e., stage one). At this stage,
technical eﬃciency can most directly be understood as translating a given amount of public
expenditures (on, say, labour and capital) into a maximum possible amount of service poten-
tial (whereas the second stage is probably more appropriately analyzed in a supply-demand
framework). This avoids the bias induced by using final outputs that are influenced by citizen
4Alternative approaches to deal with this problem, often based on advanced econometric techniques, are
reviewed and discussed with respect to productive eﬃciency in the education sector by Cordero-Ferrera et al.
(2008).
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coproduction (see above).5 Moreover, and importantly, focus on this first stage also mitigates
identification concerns raised, among others, by Hoxby (1999, 2000). Indeed, analysing the
eﬀect of Tiebout choice on local education outcomes, she relies on an instrumental variables
approach to separate variation "driven by exogenous factors that aﬀect the supply of school
districts" from that which "is endogenous to observed student achievement or that is driven
by the demand for school districts" (Hoxby, 2000, 1210, boldface added). Our exclusion of
demand-side factors by focusing on the first-stage of the public good production process has
an equivalent eﬀect on the model’s identification possibilities, without requiring an instru-
mental variables technique (which, in eﬀect, has not been developed yet for the empirical
model we introduce below).
Two potential limitations of our approach should be pointed out here. First, one might
argue that thus far we implicitly assume public service providers to provide services fitting to
local preferences. In other words, decisions regarding service potential are assumed to reflect
the characteristics of expected demanders. For example, service providers are less likely
to provide access during weekends in areas where everybody works weekends, while libraries
probably buy more (less) children’s books in communities with high birthrates (large share of
elderly). This, however, need not hold in reality and we fully agree that a library providing
unwanted services (e.g., books no one has an interest in reading, but which are the most
inexpensive available) should not be designated as fulfilling its task, even when it provides the
maximum possible amount of services for a given budget. Indeed, a more appropriate overall
benchmark would be to consider how the service provider performs in terms of the production
of services relevant for the socio-demographic make-up of the jurisdiction. However, this
argument introduces the appropriateness of services or the responsiveness of the local service
provider into the analysis (see also footnote 1), and thus goes beyond productive eﬃciency
in a strict sense. Once again, it is important to stress that we are not claiming that these
additional elements are less important than productive eﬃciency, but simply that analyses
of pure productive eﬃciency should regard the appropriate framework and not implicitly
encompass such eﬀects.
Second, the clear distinction made above may not be all that clear in reality and public
service providers could be argued to generally have some influence or control over the second
stage of the production process. For example, librarians have an important role to facilitate
or actively promote reading through the amount and quality of assistance programs, courses
and/or lectures oﬀered; fire services are involved in raising awareness of fire risk and preven-
tion; and so on. Still, such demand-influencing activities by service providers could within
5Referring once more to Becker (1965) and Lancaster (1966), our focus on stage one of the public good
production process is similar to arguing that the productive eﬃciency of private-sector firms is best evaluated
using ’goods’ and not ’commodities’ as the firms’ output. This is, unsurprisingly and uncontroversially,
exactly what scholars of private-sector productive eﬃciency have done for decades.
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our framework be seen as first-stage outputs (i.e. service potential). While they thus do not
invalidate our suggestion to focus on stage one only (because accountability is much more
clear-cut here than in stage two), they do potentially aﬀect the interpretation of the ineﬃ-
ciency measured at stage one. Indeed, if this second-stage influence of the service provider is
ignored or no appropriate measures for such often intangible services are included, the basic
inputs used in the production of programmatic inputs are overstated and the resulting eﬃ-
ciency measure at stage one overestimates true ineﬃciency. The key requirement in avoiding
this bias would be to identify those inputs specific to stage one alone, or include variables
accounting for both tangible and intangible service potential in the analysis.6
2.2 Determinants of eﬃcient public good provision: Hypotheses
Now that we have a clear understanding of the appropriate inputs and outputs when analyz-
ing eﬃcient provision of public goods, it remains to describe what might explain variations
in eﬃciency across jurisdictions. Based on extent political economy and public choice liter-
atures, we thereby concentrate on the institutional (i.e., political, socio-demographic as well
as financial) environment in which public service providers (in this case, public libraries)
operate. In the remainder of this section, we informally motivate the empirical application
below by discussing various possible channels through which local circumstances might aﬀect
local public library eﬃciency.
Firstly, the political environment is likely to matter because (1) right-wing parties and (2)
male politicians might have diﬀerent priorities compared to, respectively, left-wing govern-
ments and female politicians. This prediction follows from a large political economy literature
stating that ideology determines politicians’ policy preferences (e.g., Hibbs, 1977), as well as
from more recent evidence indicating that gender is an important indicator of policy prefer-
ences (e.g., Lott and Kenny, 1999; Edlund and Pande, 2002) and determines policy outcomes
(e.g., Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004; Geys and Revelli, 2009; Svaleryd, 2009). Specifically,
this literature suggests that the latter groups - i.e. left-wing and female politicians - tend
to be more egalitarian and socially conscious. Translated to the present setting, this could
lead left-wing and female politicians to be more inclined to focus on non-economic benefits
of libraries (i.e., supplying the opportunity to read for the less well-oﬀ, stimulating the popu-
lation to read more extensively, etc.), thereby putting more pressure on local public libraries
to maximize their service potential (given the limited budget). In other words, for a given
budget, they might be more likely to push for higher service potential.
Still, a second channel through which the political environment might matter is that left-
wing parties often have close links to (public sector) trade unions. As a result, they might
6Note that ignoring potential variation in the quality of service potential across service providers would
have similar eﬀects.
8
experience a stronger motivation to create ’rents’ for public sector unions (Grossman and
Helpman, 2001). This could result in shifting existing inputs towards labour (i.e. more staﬀ,
less books) or to increasing the library’s overall budget to support additional employment
(Mueller and Murrell, 1986). In either case, however, it is not immediately clear how such
budget re-allocation or expansion would aﬀect libraries’ productive eﬃciency. Indeed, neither
need imply a less productive eﬃcient use of funds — unless one is willing to assume, say, that
higher labour usage is necessarily detrimental to productive eﬃciency.
This discussion yields a first hypothesis:
H1: Library eﬃciency is aﬀected by a) the ideological stance of the local government and
b) the share of women in the local council.
The municipal socio-demographic make-up is likely to aﬀect library eﬃciency through its
influence on the demand and willingness to pay for cultural goods. Both of these generally
rise with income (e.g., Throsby, 1994; Schulze and Ursprung, 1998), such that high-income
residents “may constitute a special interest group striving for cultural provisions” (Werck et
al., 2008, 47). They may therefore pressure local public libraries to maximize their service
potential given budgetary constraints. Related, distance is often argued to play a crucial
role in deciding whether or not to visit a cultural event (e.g., Verhoeﬀ, 1992; Boter et al.,
2005; De Graaﬀ et al., 2009; Bhatt, 2010). High concentration of population, by reducing
the average cost of travelling to the library, thus increases the group of potential users of the
library’s services. Moreover, lower travel costs can be argued to increase the ‘option value’ of
library services.7 As such, for a given population size, urban areas (which are more densely
populated) may have a larger share of its population interested in and striving for the eﬃcient
public provision of cultural goods (in this case, library services). In both cases, one could
interpret the variables’ eﬀects also in terms of a monitoring argument (see also below): i.e.
with more people likely to use libraries, monitoring of how the library is using its resources
is likely to increase.
We should note, however, that the possibility of congestion (for early analyses of con-
gestion in public good provision, see, e.g., Brueckner, 1981; Hochman, 1982; Oates, 1988)
may not only limit service provision when demand is very high (aﬀecting the library’s final
output), but might also limit the force of the previous arguments. Indeed, expectation of
congestion may well reduce individuals’ propensity to pressure local service providers for
eﬃcient provision by diminishing their expected benefit of the service: i.e. the benefit of the
service becomes discounted by the probability of not achieving it due to congestion. This is
supported by studies showing reduced willingness-to-pay as well as willingness-to-travel when
7This follows from standard option pricing theory. Specifically, a decrease in the ‘strike price’ of an option
(e.g., through lower travel costs) to acquire a given underlying commodity (i.e., library services) increases its
value (see also Werck et al., 2008).
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expected congestion increases (e.g., McConnell, 1977; Menz and Mullen, 1981; Ashworth and
Johnson, 1996; for a review relating to cultural resources, see Noonan, 2003).
This discussion leads to our second hypothesis:
H2: Library eﬃciency is aﬀected by a jurisdictions’ a) wealth and b) population density.
Finally, we know from principal-agent theory that monitoring reduces information asym-
metries between principal and agent. Indeed, this literature shows that under perfect moni-
toring a first-best solution can still be reached. In other words, there is a strong disciplining
eﬀect of monitoring that - by limiting possibilities for wasteful spending and rent extrac-
tion by the agent - is strictly welfare-improving (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Jensen and
Meckling, 1976; Holmström, 1979). Recent experimental evidence generally supports this
prediction (e.g., Nagin et al., 2002; Dickinson and Villeval, 2008). Importantly, monitoring
is likely to be higher when a larger share of library spending derives from local sources (i.e.,
fees and municipal subsidies) rather than subsidies from higher-level governments. The rea-
son lies in a form of fiscal illusion, whereby voters fail to fully understand that grants from
higher-level governments have to be financed through tax revenues by these governments as
well (and that they will at least partly provide these resources). Such an imperfect mapping
of consumers and financiers of library services (or, in other words, when fiscal institutions
are not built on the principle of ‘fiscal equivalence’; Olson, 1969) reduces the incentive to
act as eﬃciency guards. It is, after all, perceived to be other people’s money that is being
wasted, and voters may well care about government (in)eﬃciency only when they are directly
confronted with the tax bill for public good provision. In other words, local public libraries’
accountability to the public (for fees and charges) and higher-level governments (who pro-
vide grants) may diﬀer. Applying this line of argument to our setting, libraries are “more
likely to value the careful use of public money when it originates mainly from own revenue
sources rather than external transfers” (Geys et al., 2010, 266). This gives our third and final
hypothesis (for similar arguments, see Hoxby, 2000; Hemmeter, 2006):
H3: Library eﬃciency is higher when resources derive to a larger extent from own revenues.
3 Empirical methodology
To estimate eﬃciency in the first stage of the library production process and to determine
its politico-economy influences (which are in the remainder considered as exogenous from the
library’s point of view), we could in principle employ several modelling techniques. However,
a closer look at the data and hypotheses limits the possibilities. First, we should focus on
a non-parametric model as there is no a priori information on the appropriate production
technology for public services. In other words, we have no reason to believe that the relation-
ship between the inputs, outputs and exogenous characteristics follows a specific functional
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form (e.g., Cobb-Douglas, Translog, Fourier, ...). Although non-parametric models have a
lower rate of convergence, they have been shown to be more consistent compared to wrongly
specified parametric models (Kneip et al., 1998). Second, as we have no information on price
variables, we have to rely on a branch of non-parametric models particularly designed for
public performance analysis: Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA; Charnes et al., 1978) and
Free Disposal Hull (FDH; Deprins et al., 1984). Finally, given that we want to control for het-
erogeneity and test for the influence of the exogenous environment on productive eﬃciency,
the choice of modelling techniques is further narrowed to conditional eﬃciency estimators
(Daraio and Simar, 2005, 2007) and, in particular, conditional eﬃciency models that allow
for discrete and continuous exogenous variables (De Witte and Kortelainen, 2008).
The model starts from the set χn of observed combinations of inputs x (x ∈ R
p
+) and
outputs y (y ∈ Rq+). The set of all feasible input-output combinations defines the production
technology: Ψ =
©
(x, y) ∈ Rp+q+ | x can produce y
ª
. To determine the eﬃciency of the eval-
uated libraries, we start from the best practice observations, i.e., the libraries that are using
the least inputs x for a given amount of outputs y (this is the so-called input-orientation; for
alternative orientations, see Fried et al., 2008). These best practice observations constitute
the best practice frontier, i.e., the border of the production technology Ψ. The ineﬃciency θ
of the evaluated entity (x, y) is estimated as the distance to the best practice frontier:
θ(x, y) = inf {θ | (θx, y) ∈ Ψ} (1)
where the input eﬃciency measure θ(x, y) ≤ 1 is the proportionate decrease of inputs, which
the library operating at level (x, y) should attain in order to be considered ‘eﬃcient’ (i.e.,
θ(x, y) = 1).
Two options now arise. One could impose convexity on the production possibilities (as in
DEA) or not (as in FDH). Not imposing convexity clearly implies a more general approach.
Moreover, there are “no valid theoretical arguments for assuming a priori that production
possibilities are truly convex” (Cherchye et al., 2000, 263-264) and some empirical studies
suggest violations of the convexity hypothesis (e.g., Hasenkamp, 1976). Hence, as there is no
clear justification in our application to estimate a convex hull around the data, we concentrate
on the FDH model. The FDH model estimates the production possibility set as:
ΨˆFDH =
©
(x, y) ∈ Rp+q+ | y ≤ yi, x ≥ xi, (xi, yi) ∈ χn
ª
. (2)
The FDH estimator for the Farrell input-oriented eﬃciency score is obtained by replacing Ψ
with Ψˆ in equation (1).
However, a major disadvantage of the traditional non-parametric FDH model is that all n
observations in the sample χn are considered to be potential best practices: Prob((x, y) Ψ) =
1. Therefore, atypical observations (e.g., due to measurement errors, very atypical structure
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of the entity, and so on) heavily influence the best practice frontier and, as a direct result,
the eﬃciency scores. To reduce the influence of these atypical observations, we follow Cazals
et al. (2002) in estimating the FDH eﬃciency of equation (1) relative to a partial frontier
constituting of m < n observations. By repeatedly drawing (B times) with replacement a
subset of m observations among those xi such that yi ≥ y and averaging the eﬃciency scores
relative to these B subsets, we obtain a so-called robust eﬃciency estimate θm(x, y) [robust
in the sense that the eﬃciency scores are more robust to outlying observations]. The robust
estimates θm(x, y) are no longer bounded by 1 as the evaluated observation is not always
included in the reference set. These ‘super-eﬃcient’ eﬃciency scores (i.e., if θm(x, y) < 1)
indicate that the observation is using less inputs than the average m evaluated observations
in its reference set. As such, the super-eﬃcient observation is doing better than what would
be expected.8
The robust eﬃciency approach of Cazals et al. (2002) proves extremely convenient to
incorporate the exogenous environment. Traditional non-parametric models suﬀer from a
separability condition in that the operational environment is assumed not to influence the
inputs and outputs. However, in real life applications, this is clearly unrealistic. The condi-
tional eﬃciency approach, developed by Cazals et al. (2002) and Daraio and Simar (2005,
2007), allows to incorporate the exogenous environment. Basically, while using the robust
eﬃciency model described above, the idea is to draw the subsample of size m in such a way
that similar observations have a higher probability of being drawn. In practice, one obtains
weights by estimating a kernel density around the evaluated exogenous characteristics. Hence,
the resulting ’conditional’ eﬃciency estimates θm(x, y | z) compare like with likes. As the
seminal contributions did not allow for multivariate analysis of both discrete and continuous
exogenous variables, De Witte and Kortelainen (2008) extended the approach. Basically,
their approach uses mixed (i.e., both discrete and continuous) Kernel smoothing around the
exogenous variables such that for every observation the probability of being similar to the
evaluated observation is known.
A second advantage of the De Witte and Kortelainen (2008) extension - crucial for our
analysis - arises from the possibility for statistical inference concerning the influence of the
exogenous variables. This extends the original contribution of Daraio and Simar (2005),
which allowed for a graphical inference on the eﬀect of exogenous variables (i.e., favorable
or unfavorable), to estimating a non-parametric p-value (using an on bootstrapping based
approach). Similar as in Daraio and Simar (2005, 2007), the procedure is implemented by
estimating the eﬀect of the exogenous variables on the ratio of the conditional θm(x, y | z)
to the unconditional θm(x, y) eﬃciency. Indeed, if an exogenous variable has an unfavorable
8Following the literature (e.g., Daraio and Simar, 2007), we select the size of the partial frontier m as the
value of m as of which the percentage of super-eﬃcient observations is only decreasing marginally with m.
In our application, this corresponds to m = 50 (whereas n = 290, see below).
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eﬀect on performance, then θm(x, y | z) (i.e., eﬃciency when taking z into account) will
be larger than the unconditional eﬃciency θm(x, y) for large values of z compared to small
values of z (Daraio and Simar, 2007). Non-parametrically bootstrapping this non-parametric
regression allows us to obtain statistical inference (in particular, p-values) on the correla-
tion between the environmental variable and the eﬃciency score (which, clearly, does not
necessarily constitute a causal eﬀect).9
4 Institutional setting and data
Our empirical application exploits an exceptionally rich dataset of (all 290) municipal public
libraries in Flanders in 2007. The data derive from the Department ‘Social Development and
Local Cultural Policy’ (Afdeling Volksontwikkeling en Lokaal Cultuurbeleid) of the Flemish
Regional government. They collect - and make publicly available - information on library
revenues (e.g., subsidies, fines and fees), expenditures (on personnel, infrastructure, library
collection maintenance), collection size (e.g., books, CDs, DVDs, and so on) and operations
(i.e., circulation, requests, and so on) since 1998. We employ the most recent data available
(i.e., 2007) as a change in the data collection methodology in 2006 makes the resulting data
imperfectly comparable across time. Data on opening hours are unfortunately not centrally
collected and have been brought together by contacting all 290 libraries.
Given that FDH-based approaches - as the one employed here - tend to be sensitive to
the number of inputs and outputs included (inclusion of more inputs and outputs increases
the number of eﬃcient observations; see Kneip et al., 1998), we opt for three input and four
output variables. As inputs, we use expenditures on (1) personnel, (2) operating expenditures
(Opex; mainly maintenance of the collection) and (3) infrastructure.10 It is important to note
at this point that charitable donations to and employment of volunteers in public libraries are
uncommon in Flanders (in contrast to, for example, the US) and are, as such, not included
in the analysis. These inputs, which fully exhaust the library expenditure budget, are used
to provide (1) youth books, (2) fiction and non-fiction books and (3) other media (CD,
DVD, VHS, CD-ROM) during (4) a given number of hours per week. Hence, we use three
collection-related variables (expressed in number of books) as indicators of library service
potential and add, as a fourth output, the total number of opening hours per week (since this
9Causality and endogeneity issues are traditionally dealt with by a parametric instrumental variables
(IV) approach. However, in a non-parametric setting, IV are technically impossible as eﬃciency estimators
allowing for instruments are not yet developed (neither for the non-parametric estimator used here, as for
the parametric / semi-parametric alternatives available in the literature; see Fried et al., 2008).
10This infrastructure spending does not refer to big investment projects (such as major renovations or
additions to the library buildings), which tend to be lumpy and time-specific. Instead, it measures the
annual, contemporaneous expenditure on infrastructure that occurs because books must be housed in an
enclosed space and larger book collections require a larger space with higher maintenance costs.
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proxies the actual accessibility of the library collection for potential borrowers).11 We should
thereby note that although the three former output variables correspond to stock measures,
which may benefit older libraries, the variable returns to scale approach employed in our
FDH model smoothly accounts for this (see Fried et al., 2008). Descriptive statistics of the
variables employed are presented in Table 1.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics for 2007 (n=290)
Average St. Dev Min Max
Inputs (in €)
Personnel 366539 474973 52914 4698859
Opex 70725 80184 5897 609432
Infrastructure 66827 217529 103 1794090
Outputs (in absolute amounts)
Opening hours per week 24 10 10 51
Youth books 25120 20800 4602 161986
Fiction and non-fiction books 40852 38909 6806 285218
Media (CD, DVD, VHS, CD-ROM) 33455 59187 0 523144
Operational environment
Ideological complexion ICG (0-10 scale) 5.022 0.727 2.500 6.300
Female in council (%) 0.336 0.078 0.080 0.600
Female mayor (dummy) 0.093 0.291 0 1
Income (in 1000€) 12.930 1.390 9.547 17.536
Population (total in absolute amount) 19780 20034 2337 235143
Population density (per km2) 527 427 62 3053
Subsidies Flanders (%) 0,833 0,102 0,165 0,979
To evaluate the three central hypotheses derived in Section 3.2, we examine the eﬀects of
the (1) ideological stance of the local government, (2) share of women in the local council, (3)
wealth of the municipality, (4) population concentration, and (5) source of public funding.
These are measured as follows:
First, we measure the Ideological Complexion of the local Government (ICG) as ICG =Pn
i=1 (pi.Complexioni), where pi is the seat share of party i in the College of Mayor and
Aldermen (i.e., the local government) and Complexioni refers to the ideological position of
11Clearly, the service potential of a library goes beyond these four variables and can be thought to also
include the amount and quality of assistance programs, courses, lectures and/or exhibitions oﬀered. Unfortu-
nately, however, data for such outputs are unavailable. As such, to the extent that basic inputs are employed
for the provision of such services, our analysis is likely to over-estimate true technical ineﬃciency in stage
one of the public service production process (see above).
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this party on a Left-Right scale (from 0 to 10). The data concerning a party’s ideological
position were obtained from Buelens et al. (2008) and are based on a self-placement survey
asking presidents and spokesmen of the parties in the municipalities to locate their party on
an ideological scale between 0 (Left) and 10 (Right). The figures range from 2.0 (Groen!) to
6.3 (Open VLD) (the extreme-right-wing party Vlaams Belang was not represented in any
local government and is therefore not in the dataset). As a higher ICG score represents more
a right-wing government, we expect an unfavorable eﬀect on eﬃciency.
Second, to measure the influence of female representation, we use two operationalizations.
The first measures female representation as the share of female members in the municipal
council (the local parliament). The more women are elected into the council, the more likely
it is that female preferences are translated into actual policies. The second operationalization
attempts to establish whether female preferences are more likely to come about when there
is a female mayor. In this case, we define female representation using an indicator variable
equal to 1 when the mayor is female, 0 otherwise.12
Third, real taxable per capita income (in €1000) is included to assess whether eﬃciency
diﬀers in wealthier municipalities. Population density (measured as inhabitants per km2) is
taken up as a measure for the degree of urbanization.
Finally, libraries are a heavily subsidized public service in Flanders. A large share of these
subsidies derives from the Flemish Regional government, which provides each municipality
with a ’basic subsidy’ of 6€ per inhabitant (with a minimum of 50,000€) towards the financing
of its library personnel. These subsidies constitute no less than 83% of total library revenues
on average (though varying between 16.5% and 97.9%; see Table 1). The remaining revenue
is provided by municipal subsidies and various alternative resources such as membership fees,
borrowing fees and fines. We include the share of regional subsidies in the total library budget
to evaluate the third hypothesis, i.e. whether eﬃciency is higher (lower) when resources derive
to a larger extent from own revenues (higher-level government subsidies).
5 Results
The results of the eﬃciency estimations are summarized in Table 2. In column 1, we present
the results when we do not account for the exogenous environment (i.e., ‘unconditional’
eﬃciency). We find an average eﬃciency score of 0.79. This indicates that, on average,
Flemish local public libraries would have to decrease their inputs by approximately 21% in
order to produce their outputs equally eﬃcient as the best practices. There is, however, a very
12Still, the data do not allow us to interpret our findings as causal evidence in favour of female influence.
Indeed, women might simply get voted into oﬃce more often in municipalities that have a more ‘egalitarian’
population. As such, it might be underlying diﬀerences in popular preferences (rather than women’s policy
preferences as such) causing both a higher share of female councillors and more eﬃcient libraries.
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large variation in the performance across libraries, as can be seen from the sizeable standard
deviation around this average ineﬃciency. Moreover, some eﬃciency scores are significantly
larger than 1 (i.e., θm(x, y) < 1). Hence, some observations can be viewed as super-eﬃcient:
they perform better than the average m observations in their reference sample.
To examine Hypotheses 1 to 3, we develop five alternative conditional eﬃciency models.
In Model 1, we examine the influence of ideological stance, share of female politicians in the
local council, average income, and population concentration by analyzing their correlation
with the eﬃciency score via a nonparametric bootstrap procedure (see above). Model 2 adds
population size to this baseline model, in order to check whether the population concentration
eﬀect not merely derives from a larger population as such. Model 3 adds a dummy variable
for female mayors to assess whether this has an independent eﬀect on public library eﬃciency,
after controlling for overall female representation in the local council (as in Model 1). To test
Hypothesis 3, we include the percentage of regional subsidies in total library revenues, while
controlling for the ideological preferences (in Model 4) and average income (Model 5) of the
municipality. A systematic presentation is given in Table 3.
Once we account for the exogenous environment (i.e., conditional eﬃciency), our earlier
conclusions change in two important ways (results summarized in columns 2 to 6 of Table
2). First, the average eﬃciency score no longer significantly deviates from 1. Second, the
standard deviation around this mean reduces significantly. Both results indicate that a large
part of the variation in ineﬃciency observed in the unconditional eﬃciency estimates can
be explained by the exogenous factors and, as a result, we are able to determine to a large
degree the apparent source(s) of the previously-observed eﬃciency diﬀerences.
These summarized results, however, do not allow us to evaluate Hypothesis 1-3. Thus,
we represent the full estimation results for all five conditional models in Table 3. We thereby
consider the eﬀect on the median, rather than the mean, as the former is less influenced by
extreme values. Note also that, due to the structure of the non-parametric bootstrap, we only
present whether the exogenous variable has a significant (un)favorable eﬀect on eﬃciency.
The marginal coeﬃcient on the median is less meaningful (see De Witte and Kortelainen,
2008).
Table 2: Order-m eﬃciency score (N=290)
Unconditional Conditional
(robust FDH) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Average 0.7892 1.0507 0.9891 1.0078 1.1082 1.0096
St. Dev. 0.6575 0.1946 0.1294 0.1606 0.2394 0.2029
Min 0.1965 0.5315 0.4778 0.5061 0.5018 0.5019
Max 5.4843 2.4027 2.0493 2.4284 2.0760 2.0093
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Table 3: Influence of the exogenous environment on service potential of libraries
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
ICG unfavorable unfavorable unfavorable unfavorable unfavorable
(<2E-16) *** (<2E-16) *** (<2E-16) *** (0.0783 * (0.060) *
Female council favorable favorable unfavorable
(0.235) (0.372) (0.540)
Income favorable favorable favorable favorable
(0.025) ** (<2E-16) *** (0.020) ** (<2 E-6) ***
Population density favorable favorable favorable
(0.090) * (<2E-16) *** (0.010) ***
Population (total) favorable
(0.830)
Female mayor unfavorable
(0.170)
Regional subsidies unfavorable unfavorable
(0.045) ** (0.057) *
Note: n=290; Bootstrapped p-values between brackets; ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5%
and 10%-level.
Our results provide strong evidence in line with the first part of our first hypothesis. That
is, right wing councils are associated with a statistically significantly lower level of public
library productive eﬃciency, ceteris paribus. This finding is robust across all specifications,
and suggests that left-wing governments are indeed more likely to care about maximizing
library service potential (under a given budget). The second half of our first hypothesis is
not supported. That is, although the share of female representatives in the local council
is positive related to median eﬃciency this fails to be statistically significant. A similar
conclusion is reached when examining the influence of a female mayor on eﬃciency (Model
3). Female mayors are not associated with a significantly higher level of library performance,
ceteris paribus.13
We find strong support for Hypothesis 2. Municipalities with higher income and urban-
ization levels (i.e., more densely populated) have better performing libraries. The latter eﬀect
is not driven by population size. Indeed, when including population size in the estimation
(Model 2), this turns out to be insignificant, while the eﬀect of population concentration
remains unaﬀected.
13One potential explanation for this non-finding might be that municipalities with high female representa-
tion also tend to have more left-wing governments (assuming women are more likely to run - and be elected -
on left-wing party lists). This, however, is not supported by the data. Indeed, while we do find the expected
negative correlation between ICG and fcouncil, this relation is weak (r=-0.1140; p=0.07).
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Finally, our results confirm Hypothesis 3. Libraries turn out to have a higher service po-
tential for a given budget when library revenues derive to a larger extent from local resources
(i.e., municipal subsidies, fees and fines). This confirms the idea that monitoring has a strong
and positive eﬀect on local public good provision, and that incentives for monitoring are
undermined when a larger share of income derives from higher-level government subsidies.
This supports Hemmeter’s (2006) findings for a sample of 3308 US library systems. It also
links to recent findings by Geys et al. (2010, 1), who show that "the eﬃciency-enhancing
eﬀect of voter involvement" in German municipalities is significantly reduced when a larger
share of local revenues comes from intergovernmental subsidies.
6 Conclusion
Economic eﬃciency — in terms of maximizing output for a given level of inputs (e.g., Koop-
mans, 1951; Fried et al., 2008) — has recently become an increasingly important element in
public good provision. This has lead to a concomitant increase in scholarly attention for the
determinants of such eﬃciency. We added to this burgeoning literature in three ways.
First, we characterized public good provision as a two-stage production process. One
stage translates basic inputs into service potential, while a second stage describes how these
are transformed into observed outcomes. This separation is crucial to accurately defining
inputs and outputs in the analysis of productive eﬃciency (and thus determines the accuracy
of the results from such analyses). Indeed, as the second stage outcomes are influenced by
public demand (and thus in part lie beyond the control of the public service provider), they
are inappropriate to evaluate the pure productive eﬃciency of public good provision. Hence,
we argued that one should concentrate on the first stage (in which the production of service
potential is fully under control of the service provider).
Second, we employed a specially tailored and fully non-parametric framework, which is
rooted in popular Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) models (Charnes et al., 1978). By
using a robust (i.e., allowing for outlying observations; Cazals et al., 2002) and conditional
(i.e., allowing for heterogeneity; Daraio and Simar, 2005, 2007) eﬃciency framework, we were
able to evaluate non-parametrically (i.e., without any a priori assumption on the production
function) how discrete and continuous exogenous variables aﬀect productive eﬃciency. We
thereby included the operational environment immediately in the eﬃciency estimates, thus
avoiding use of a separability condition, which inappropriately assumes that the exogenous
environment does not have an impact on the inputs and outputs.
Third, relying on a large political economy and public choice literature, we used the above
framework to examine how political economy factors aﬀect eﬃciency of local public good
provision. Our findings - using data on 290 Flemish local public libraries - suggest that library
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productive eﬃciency is higher when (1) the ideological stance of the local government is more
left-wing, (2) the population is wealthier, (3) the area is more densely populated and (4)
public service revenues derive to a larger extent from local resources. In addition, our results
indicate that, ceteris paribus, (5) population size, (6) the share of female representatives
in the local council, and (7) having a female mayor does not significantly aﬀect library
performances.
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